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Abstract 
 
With the prospective exit of the UK from the European Union, a crucial question is whether EU 
Structural Funds have been beneficial for the country and which aspects of Cohesion Policy should 
be maintained if EU funds are to be replaced. This paper addresses this question through a twofold 
investigation, assessing not only whether but also how EU funds have contributed to regional growth 
in the UK over three programming periods from 1994 to 2013. We document a significant and robust 
effect of Cohesion Policy in the UK, with higher proportions of Structural Funds associated to higher 
economic growth both on the whole and particularly in the less developed regions of the country. In 
addition, we show that the strategic orientation of investments also plays a distinct role for regional 
growth. While concentration of investments on specific pillars seems to have no direct growth effects, 
unless regions can rely on pre-existing competitive advantages in key development areas, we unveil 
clear evidence that targeting investments on specific areas of relative regional need has a significant 
and autonomous effect on growth. These findings have important implications for the design of 
regional policy interventions in Britain after Brexit. 
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An assessment of EU Cohesion Policy in the UK regions:  
direct effects and the dividend of targeting 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the consequences of UK’s exit from the European Union will be that the 
country will no longer be eligible to receive EU Structural Funds. This represents 
not only a potential financial loss in the area of local economic development policies 
but also a prospective problem of policy design – indeed, it has been argued that 
filling the policy vacuum generated by the loss of Cohesion Policy after Brexit will 
be far from simple (Bachtler & Begg, 2017). In this context, it appears timely to ask 
whether EU funds have contributed to fostering the economic performance of 
recipient UK regions and examine what have been the successful features of EU 
spending that should perhaps be maintained once regional policy responsibility 
becomes fully ‘repatriated’ to the national level.  
The existing economic literature provides rather little evidence on these important 
issues. Despite the bourgeoning research on the economic effects and overall 
effectiveness of EU Cohesion Policy, studies examining the contribution of 
structural funds on regional economic performance in the UK are far and few 
between (two recent exceptions, both in the impact-assessment tradition, are Di 
Cataldo, 2017, and Becker et al., 2017).1 The evidence produced by the broader 
European literature is also of limited help, as findings on the economic effects of the 
policy are not fully conclusive (cf. Dall’erba & Le Gallo, 2008; Becker et al., 2010; and 
Bouayad-Agha et al., 2013) and seem to vary across national and regional contexts 
                                                 
 1 Less recent studies often had either a narrower programme-specific focus (Armstrong & Wells, 2006) or focused on issues of governance and institutional fit (Gripaios & Bishop, 2006).  
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(e.g., industrial structure – Cappelen et al., 2003; or institutional quality – 
Rodriguez-Pose & Garcilazo, 2015).  
More importantly, the literature is also relatively moot on how the prioritising on 
specific expenditure categories may influence the effectiveness of Cohesion Policy 
expenditures. Only a handful of studies exist on this issue, providing mostly 
indirect evidence on the role of prioritising specific investment axes vis-à-vis 
balancing expenditures across different policy targets (Rodriguez-Pose & Fratesi, 
2004; Becker et al., 2017), or on the role of targeting interventions to the local 
specificities and factor endowments of regions (Sotiriou & Tsiapa, 2015; Crescenzi 
& Giua, 2016; Crescenzi et al., 2017).2  
In this paper we focus exclusively on the UK context and build on the literature 
assessing the strategic designs of EU policies to empirically assess not only whether 
but also how EU funds have contributed to improve the economic performance of 
UK regions. Using recently released data with detailed information on Structural 
Funds payments by programming period and by category of expenditures, we 
produce a unique analysis of the regional economic effect of Cohesion Policy in the 
UK, examining the role that aspects of design and fund-deployment have had on 
this.  
We start by testing the economic returns of EU funds using annual data for 1994-
2013. We find a significant and robust effect, showing that higher proportions of EU 
Structural Funds are associated to higher economic growth rates. This relationship 
appears strictly linear; even among the regions receiving the largest bulk of the 
funds we find no evidence of either threshold or exhaustion effects. Assignment 
into Objective 1 or Convergence status is positively and significantly associated 
with regional growth, a result which is mainly due to a positive effect of receiving 
                                                 
 2  Policy design issues are more commonly addressed in the qualitative literature (see Piattoni & Polverari, 2016), but at the expense of statistical inference and generalisation. 
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such status (‘entering’ into the programme) rather than to being adversely affected 
by losing eligibility (‘de-assignment’).  
Subsequently, we turn our focus to the strategic orientation of investments, drawing 
on a consistent classification of expenditures along five development pillars, for the 
two programming periods 2000-06 and 2007-13. We focus on two key aspects: (a) 
the concentration of funds across a range of interventions and in areas of pre-
existing regional strength; and (b) the ‘alignment’ between committed expenditures 
and measured regional ‘needs’. While we find little evidence that focusing on any 
one of these pillars has direct growth impacts – concentration of funding seems to 
be on the whole harmful for growth unless it concerns spending on an existing 
specialisation in innovation or tourism – we uncover clear evidence that 
misalignment between effort (allocation of funds to specific categories) and regional 
needs (areas of main weakness vis-à-vis other regions) significantly penalises the 
economic performance of a region. This suggests that investment allocation and 
fund-deployment strategies have real efficiency implications: carefully identifying 
and targeting the main socio-economic disadvantages of regions can increase the 
effectiveness of the policy interventions for any amount of available resources.  
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a background discussion on 
the rationale behind EU development strategies, reviewing the existing literature 
assessing the effectiveness of different strategic designs and explaining our own 
conceptualisation of this. Section 3 discusses the data and estimation approach. 
Section 4 explains our approach to measuring regional needs and gives a descriptive 
picture of the distribution of relative regional need across the UK NUTS2 regions. 
Section 5 presents the first part of the empirical analysis, assessing the relationship 
between Cohesion Policy expenditure and economic growth. Section 6 examines 
instead the growth effects of fund-deployment characteristics (concentration, 
targeting). Section 7 discusses the implications of our findings and concludes. 
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2. The issue of policy design: literature, policy and 
conceptual frame 
The regional development policies promoted by the European Union have evolved 
over time. In its origin, EU Cohesion Policy was conceived as a tool to 
counterbalance the regional disparities inevitably emerging from the market system 
(Armstrong, 2011). The main focus was on physical capital investment, particularly 
transport infrastructure, and the primary objective was economic convergence 
(European Commission, 2014). Following political as well as academic criticism of 
this approach, the focus gradually shifted from redistribution to allocation and from 
large infrastructure investment to softer infrastructures (R&D, education) and a 
more diversified investment mix; while more recent reforms – stimulated further by 
a number of influential contributions (Barca, 2009; Farole et al., 2011; Barca et al., 
2012; Camagni & Capello, 2015) – shifted the strategic orientation of Cohesion Policy 
towards more comprehensive and integrated interventions (Bachtler et al., 2017).  
According to the current vision, a differentiated (‘place-based’) approach in each 
regional context represents the key for the success of development strategies – 
infused with a ‘smart specialisation’ perspective (McCann & Ortega-Argiles, 2015), 
based on fostering the key innovative assets of each region and on identifying key 
areas of weakness and the combination of advantages that can stimulate growth. 
In poorer regions, infrastructure provision is now mixed with important measures 
in other development areas such as education, business development, and the 
promotion of innovation (McCann & Rodriguez-Pose, 2011). Moreover, the new 
policy paradigm gives increasing importance to local and regional actors in the 
definition of development strategies. Mobilising local players, it is claimed, allows 
for a deeper understanding of the specific needs and competitive advantage of 
places and design bottom-up interventions accordingly (Barca et al., 2012). Regional 
policies carefully considering local preferences and specificities are regarded as 
  Marco Di Cataldo & Vassilis Monastiriotis 
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superior to top-down approaches in their capacity to stimulate, otherwise 
untapped, economic potential.  
Following these changes, a small literature has started to emerge seeking to assess 
how the design of EU strategies conditions the effectiveness of Cohesion Policy. 
Building in part on the earlier work by Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi (2004), who 
showed that wrongly-targeted strategies overemphasising single development axes 
(e.g. transport infrastructure) are less growth-conducive, two recent studies 
examined specifically the issue of concentration of funds and the relative 
productivity of investments across axes. Sotiriou and Tsiapa (2015) looked at the 
case of Greece, finding that growth is faster in regions where the investment mix is 
related to the local endowments – i.e., that investing in one’s own area of 
specialisation matters, at least for some spending categories. In turn, Becker et al. 
(2017) showed that concentration of EU spending on single investment pillars has 
no effect on regional growth unless spending is already extremely concentrated – 
i.e., that concentration of investments matters only for high proportions of 
concentration.  
Concerning the question of the economic returns of bottom-up policy designs, 
Crescenzi and Giua (2016) have shown that the most effective strategies are those 
mixing top-down with bottom-up approaches. An alternative line of investigation 
has been opened recently by the work of Crescenzi et al. (2017). Using a selected 
sample of 15 regions from across the EU, the authors find that congruence between 
regional socio-economic needs and spending priorities is a significant factor 
influencing the effectiveness of Cohesion Policy.  
Our analysis follows this emerging literature and seeks to provide a comprehensive 
assessment of fund-deployment strategies. Our conceptual frame identifies two, not 
necessarily orthogonal, axes along which such strategies are designed. The first 
concerns the issue of concentration. Concentrating expenditures in a small number 
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of thematic areas3 creates advantages of scale and resource mobilisation and thus 
has the potential to maximise the returns to investment. Inversely, however, 
concentration may be less efficient if there are diminishing returns to investment; 
while it may also give rise to problems of information (how to choose the 
appropriate thematic areas of intervention), coordination (how to maximise the 
benefits from intervening in one area if synergies with other areas are not fully 
exploited due to under-funding) and risk-diversification (what happens if the 
targeted area – say, tourism or industry – is negatively affected by a shock or if 
targeting in that policy area fails).  
The second axis concerns the issue of targeting. Targeting investments in the areas 
of relative strength (e.g., on a region’s competitive advantages) may be an effective 
tool for maximising returns to investment and, ultimately, regional growth. 
However, in the presence of cross-thematic complementarities and/or in the absence 
of supply-side constraints within the targeted area, targeting may in fact be less 
effective for growth and less efficient economically. Take for example the case of a 
touristic area, such as Cornwall. Investing further on tourism and regeneration may 
have an obvious appeal (especially in relation to the information problem 
mentioned above). But it may be completely ineffective if further tourism 
development in the region is hindered not by supply-side constraints within the 
tourism sector (including the availability of land, of a workforce possessing relevant 
skills, or of branding initiatives) but, say, by accessibility (requiring investment in 
transport infrastructure) or by lack of supporting industries (e.g., legal and 
accounting services – requiring investments in business development and human 
resources). Theoretically, then, it is unclear whether concentration of funding (both 
                                                 
 3 Our discussion here focuses on the thematic dimension of fund-deployment, i.e., the allocation of funds across investment axes. But the frame used here applies similarly to the geographical dimension. In this case, the questions of concern are whether funds should be targeting particular regions at all (concentration) and, if so, whether they should concentrate on the more advanced (higher-capacity) or more needy (potentially higher-returns) regions (targeting).  
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thematic and geographical) and targeting on thematic areas of advantage or on 
areas of regional need has positive growth effects. This becomes an empirical 
question, which we address in the remainder of this paper. In the next section we 
explain in detail how we operationalise empirically the conceptual frame presented 
here. 
 
3. Data and empirical approach  
EU Cohesion Funds represent only a small portion of total regional investments in 
the UK. For example, in the period 2000/01-2005/06, domestic regionally identifiable 
capital expenditures averaged £28.22 billion per annum. This contrasts with the 
€2.46 billion (approximately £1.72bn) of total annual funding (commitments) 
derived from EU Cohesion Policy during the 2000-2006 programming period. In 
those terms, EU Cohesion Policy represents only a small fraction of UK regional 
investments. It should be noted, however, that Cohesion Policy expenditures are 
much more concentrated, geographically and thematically, and targeted on more 
specific development activities. For example, in one of the main recipient regions of 
EU funds (Wales), total EU expenditure represented in the same period over 22% of 
total public investment; while, across the UK, in the category of business and 
enterprise development, EU Cohesion Funds represented around one third of total 
regional investment. Importantly, London and the South East attract around 30% of 
regionally identifiable UK capital expenditure but only 6% of EU funds allocated to 
the UK; while, at the NUTS1 level, at which comparable data are available, the 
regional allocation of EU funds seems completely uncorrelated to that of domestic 
UK capital expenditures.4 Thus, although a small proportion of total regional effort, 
                                                 
 4 The correlation coefficient for the two expenditures series in the 2000-2006 period is -0.056. All numbers quoted here come from own calculations, based on the Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses (PESA) reports of the Office for National Statistics (various years) and our own data on EU Cohesion Policy commitments and payments.  
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EU Cohesion Policy appears to be largely independent of UK regional policy (at 
least in terms of the spatial allocation of domestic capital expenditures), consistent 
with the principle of additionality. For this reason, our focus in this paper is 
exclusively on the regional growth effects of EU funds 
Our analysis assesses three dimensions of EU funds, one related to the effect of total 
investments and two to the effectiveness of the design of EU investment 
programmes. The first dimension concerns the actual investment effort and its 
distribution across regions. For this, we use standard measures of assignment and 
intensity of treatment, as employed elsewhere in the literature. Assignment is 
captured by a dichotomous (dummy) variable taking the value of 1 for each region 
belonging to ‘Objective 1’ (for 1994-2006) or ‘Convergence’ status (for 2007-2013). 
Intensity is measured as a continuous variable reflecting the proportion of EU funds 
paid to UK regions, specified alternatively in per capita terms or as a share of 
regional GDP. For this analysis we use data on total annual payments to the 37 UK 
NUTS2 regions from 1994 to 2013 derived from the Structural Funds database of the 
European Commission (DG Regional Policy).5  
The second dimension refers to the relative policy effort, i.e., the allocation of funds 
across investment pillars within regions. For this, we rely on a unique dataset of 
commitment allocations, reported at the level of specific fields of interventions 
aggregated by programming period for 2000-2006 and 2007-2013.6 Based on this, we 
constructed aggregate measures of commitment allocations along five key investment 
pillars corresponding to: (1) Transport infrastructure; (2) Business support; (3) 
Research technological development and innovation (RTDI); (4) Human resources; 
                                                 
 5 Payments from the 2007-2013 programming period extend to 2014 and 2015 under the so-called n+2 rule. As these potentially overlap with payments from the 2014-2020 programming period, which are not recorded in our data, these two years are excluded from our analysis. 6 This data has been provided to us with permission by the DG Regional Policy. We are grateful to Lewis Dijkstra, Domenico Gullo, and Hugo Poelman for facilitating this. 
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and (5) Tourism, culture and regeneration.7 Following, we calculated the regional 
investment shares for each of these pillars (fund commitments in the pillar in the 
region divided by total fund commitments in the region) as well as a measure of 
concentration of effort (the sum of the squares of these shares based on a Herfindahl 
index), which we use in our empirical analysis.  
The third dimension relates to how funds have been targeted towards investment 
axes with respect to regional advantages and needs. Following Crescenzi et al. 
(2017), our main hypothesis is that targeting of expenditures towards areas of 
regional need (alignment between effort and need) can be growth-enhancing. As 
explained in section 2, a competing hypothesis is that growth is enhanced by 
allocation of funds into areas of advantage (prioritising on a region’s strengths). To 
examine these two hypotheses, we have constructed a measure of specialisation 
(spending on one’s own area of advantage) and two measures of needs-effort 
misalignment (horizontal and vertical), as explained in the next section, which we 
treat as our policy variables. Following Sotiriou and Tsiapa (2015), we also 
implement a complimentary test for the second hypothesis, by estimating separate 
growth regressions per expenditure category (similar to the concentration analysis) 
and examining the interaction effect between per capita expenditures in the 
category of interest and a measure of relative performance of each region in this 
category.  
For all three dimensions, our empirical analysis employs a specification of the 
following form: 
∆ ln (𝑌 𝑃⁄ )𝑖,𝑡 = β1ln(𝑌)𝑖,𝑡−1 + β2X𝑖,𝑡 + β3EU𝑖,𝑡 + φ𝑖 + τ𝑡 + ε𝑖,𝑡  (1) 
where ' is the first-differencing operator, i and t index regions and time, 
respectively; 𝑌  is regional GDP; 𝑃  is population; X𝑖,𝑡  is a set of regional 
                                                 
 7 We have harmonised these pillars across the two programming periods drawing on the more detailed sub-categories from each period. See Table A1 in the Appendix for details on our classification scheme. 
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characteristics including the regional unemployment rate, the share of tertiary 
education degree holders in the regional workforce, the share of agricultural 
employment and a measure of innovation capacity (patent applications per 1000 
inhabitants); EU𝑖,𝑡  is our measure relating to EU funds; φ𝑖  and τ𝑡  are vectors of 
region-specific and time dummies capturing permanent differences in growth rates 
across regions and national business-cycle effects, respectively; and ε𝑖,𝑡 is a vector 
of iid residuals.  
When estimating equation (1) using the annual dataset, t indexes years, t-1 stands 
for values one year ago and all X𝑖,𝑡  and EU𝑖,𝑡  variables are defined 
contemporaneously and measured on an annual basis, while the dependent 
variable is the annual change in the log of per capita GDP. Instead, when using the 
period-specific dataset, t indexes programming periods; t-1 stands for the year prior 
to the start of programming period t; X𝑖,𝑡  and EU𝑖,𝑡  are programming period 
averages; and the dependent variable is measured as the average annualised 
regional growth rate of GDP per capita. In all cases, standard errors are clustered at 
the NUTS2 level, the one at which Cohesion Policy eligibility is assigned, and all 
models are estimated with panel LSDV (fixed effects). 
Although this research design does not offer an identification strategy, we note that 
our policy variables (funding commitments, misalignment measures, etc.) are 
strictly pre-determined and thus exogenous in a Granger sense. Concerns about 
selection (e.g., that more expenditures go to regions with high future growth 
potential) are further minimised by the inclusion of regional fixed effects and of the 
initial level of per capita GDP8; while concerns about confoundedness are also 
limited given the lack of complementarity between EU Cohesion Policy and 
domestic regionally identifiable capital expenditures. We thus think of our 
                                                 
 8 In addition, GMM estimates, which control in part for endogeneity issues using distributed lags of the explanatory variables as instruments, produce on the whole qualitatively similar results (available upon request).  
  Marco Di Cataldo & Vassilis Monastiriotis 
 11 
estimates not only as general equilibrium effects but also as indicative of the direct 
effect of the policy variables – and thus also of the ‘counterfactual’ of the absence of 
the policy treatment. 
 
4. The measurement of regional advantage and need  
As noted, our analysis of the issue of targeting relies on measures of relative 
regional advantage and need. To measure these, we move beyond aggregate 
measures of performance, such as GDP per capita, and look instead at detailed 
socio-economic variables which map onto the five investment pillars to which our 
expenditure data relate. We started by selecting a number of socio-economic 
variables that measure the relative performance of regions along aspects that map 
directly onto the five investment pillars listed above. These were: the stock of roads 
per inhabitant and per squared km of land (for the transport infrastructure pillar); 
the share of employed people in high-tech sectors and the number of patent 
applications per thousand inhabitants (for RTDI); the share of tertiary degree 
holders in employment and the (inverse of the) percentage of unemployment 
benefit claimants (for the human resources pillar); a measure of competitiveness 
(inverse of regional unit labour costs in manufacturing) and the rate of investment 
per employee in manufacturing (for the business support pillar); and the numbers 
of tourist arrivals per inhabitant and of touristic establishments per 1000 inhabitants 
(for tourism, culture and regeneration).9 For each of these, we collected data for the 
four years to the start of each programming period and calculated average values 
across the four years, so as to capture the conditions characterising the regions in 
the period when the relevant funding commitments were being designated. We 
                                                 
 9 All data come from Eurostat with the exception of data on unemployment and Gross Value Added which come from the Nomis database of the UK Office for National Statistics. Descriptive statistics on these and all other variables used in the analysis are available in Table A2 in the Appendix, while a summary of variables used to calculate the relative performance of regions before each programming period is listed in Table A3. 
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standardised these variables using the linear scale transformation method and 
aggregated them into five pillars. The resulting variables represent a vertical 
(within-pillar across-regions) measure of relative regional strength; and the inverse 
of these ranks represents instead a measure of relative regional need per pillar.  
To measure advantage, we drew on the first type of rankings (relative strength) and 
assigned the pillar of strongest relative performance (lowest rank) of each region as 
this region’s area of advantage. By interacting this assignment indicator with our 
pillar-specific per capita investments, we derived a new variable (specialisation) 
measuring, for each region, the per capita expenditure on the investment pillar on 
which this region has a relative advantage compared to other regions. We use this 
measure to examine whether targeting expenditures on a region’s own area of 
strength enhances regional growth.10 
To measure need, we developed two complimentary measures. The first is a vertical 
measure of overall regional need, which we obtain by taking the inverse rank of the 
vertical performance scores mentioned above and averaging them across the five 
pillars, for each region.11 The second is a horizontal measure of need, showing the 
intensity of relative need of each region in each investment pillar, which we derived 
by taking the same inverse-rank scores and ranking each pillar according to its score 
within each region.12 Subsequently, we implemented a similar analysis for the per 
capita expenditures, deriving a vertical (how regions rank nationally in terms of the 
                                                 
 10 As noted, we also use an alternative to this test by taking the interaction between each standardised measure of strength (prior to ranking) per category and the per capita expenditures in the same category. Unlike the variable presented in the text, which tries to capture the total effect of expenditures targeting areas of advantage, the estimated coefficient for this interaction term captures the extra 
growth generated by each expenditure category as a region’s performance (advantage) in this category improves.  11 In our empirical analysis we complement this with an alternative measure of overall vertical need, calculated as the inverse rank of the regions with regard to their GDP per capita at the beginning of each programming period. 12 For example, for 2007-13 West Midlands ranked last in terms of its performance with regard to 
Human resources, showing a heightened ‘need’ in this pillar; but ninth in terms of Transport infrastructure, thus showing a much less urgent need there. For this region, ‘Human resources’ was 
ranked as a higher priority (need) than ‘Transport infrastructure’. 
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per capita funding they receive) and a horizontal rank-score (how pillars rank, 
within each region, in terms of their funding allocations relative to their allocations 
nationally).  
Based on these rank-scores, we proceeded to construct our two indicators of 
horizontal and vertical misalignment. Vertical misalignment is measured as the 
absolute difference between the vertical rank-score of funding commitments and 
the vertical rank-score of regional need. It thus captures how dissimilar is a region’s 
national ranking in terms of funds committed per capita to its national (vertical) 
ranking in terms of relative need. In turn, horizontal misalignment is measured as the 
absolute difference between the horizontal (within-regions) rank-score of 
commitments and the horizontal rank-score of regional need (across pillars within 
regions). This captures how dissimilar is the allocation of committed funds across 
pillars within each region to the same region’s relative ranking of need, nationally, 
in each of the five pillars. For both measures, a value of zero shows perfect 
alignment between regional needs and the prioritisation of policy interventions; 
while higher values show diminishing congruence between effort and need. 
Figure 1 presents a descriptive picture of our measures of need, linked to the 
allocation of Cohesion Policy funds across investment pillars. The first map depicts 
the geographical distribution of our vertical measure of overall regional need 
(circles layer) against that of the overall funds committed to each of the regions 
(shaded layer) using, for ease of presentation, average values across the two 
programming periods of our data. Each of the other maps shows, for one of the five 
pillars, the position of the UK NUTS2 regions with regard to their allocation of EU 
funds in this pillar (measured as a share to total) and with regard to their ranking 
in terms of need in the same category (horizontal measures of need).13 
                                                 
 13  The measures of misalignment calculated from these indicators are presented in Figure A1 in Appendix.  
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Figure 1 EU funds spent by category and needs of NUTS2 regions, 2000-2006 & 2007-2013 
   
   Note: Measures of relative regional need (circles) and shares of EU fund commitments (shades areas) as described in the text. Darker shades correspond to higher shares of EU funds. Larger circles correspond to higher values of relative need (categorised by tercile as high, medium and low).  
As can be seen, there are sometimes sizeable differences in the two geographies of 
effort and of need; while the extent of alignment between effort and needs varies 
substantially across categories. Only one out of the five areas receiving the highest 
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per capita commitments of EU funds is also classified as a ‘high need’ region (South 
Yorkshire) according to our measures14; while the majority of regions classified as 
‘high need’ rank in the medium-high category in terms of funds committed. Still, 
some degree of congruence is also present: the majority of regions located in the 
broader South East, which have low per capita commitments, appear also as regions 
of low relative need. Among the pillar-specific measures, misalignment appears to 
be particularly high in the cases of Human Resources (where low-need regions in 
the South receive more funds, in part because of EU fund allocation rules) and 
Transport Infrastructure (where our measure of road density in per capita terms 
weighs heavily in favour of urban and metropolitan areas); and lowest in the case 
of RTDI (where a significant amount is allocated to the high-need Objective 1 
regions and the old industrial heartlands).  
 
5. EU funds and economic growth in UK regions 
We start our empirical analysis by examining in this section the overall impact of 
EU structural funds on economic growth across the UK regions, i.e., the issues of 
effort and assignment as mentioned previously. The results of this analysis are 
illustrated in Table 1. 
In column (1) we present a parsimonious specification of our model, including 
region and year dummies but no further control variables. In this initial 
specification, we find clear evidence of a positive relationship between EU grants 
and regional growth. The estimated coefficient is significant at 1% and shows a 
rather sizeable effect – with a doubling of per capita funds (e.g., from our sample 
average of €27.70 to €55.40) associated to a growth rate higher by 0.23 percentage 
points (or by 8.8% based on average growth rates for the period 1994-2013). 
                                                 
 14 As noted earlier, our analysis of ‘need’ departs from the GDP-based definition of performance and thus direct comparisons with the actual income levels of the regions cannot be made here.  
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Table 1 EU funds and economic growth in UK NUTS2 regions, 1994-2013   Annual data Programming periods 
Dep. Variable: Δ ln GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)                 lagged ln GDP per capita -0.220*** -0.307*** -0.297*** -0.307*** -0.303*** -0.190*** -0.182*** -0.183***  (0.0390) (0.0350) (0.0340) (0.0351) (0.0364) (0.0243) (0.0246) (0.0146) EU funds per capita 0.000084*** 0.000114**  0.000135* 0.000132* 0.000083*    (2.95e-05) (4.49e-05)  (7.67e-05) (6.96e-05) (4.21e-05)   EU funds per capita squared    -1.05e-07          (3.89e-07)      Objective 1 regions   0.00857*  0.00885*   0.00755***     (0.00437)  (0.00516)   (0.00247)  (Obj1 regions) x (EU funds per capita)     0.000082**          (3.27e-05)     Obj1 status: entering         0.0108**          (0.00480) Obj1 status: exiting         0.00389          (0.00582)           Controls  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Year/programming period dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Observations 693 613 613 613 613 109 109 109 R-squared 0.751 0.778 0.776 0.778 0.778 0.953 0.953 0.953 NUTS2 regions 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 VIF statistic (overall) 1.03 1.62 1.60 3.06 2.17 1.99 1.95 1.80 Clustered standard errors at NUTS2 level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year dummies included in columns (1)-(5), programming period dummies included in columns (6)-(8). EU funds per capita: payments per year (columns (1),(2),(4),(5)); payments per programming period (column (6)). 
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Expressed in different terms, this shows that one additional euro of EU funds per 
capita (a cost of about €65m) would raise average per capita incomes by €1.87 (a 
gain of approximately £121m). The effect loses somewhat its statistical significance 
when controls are included in the model (column (2)), but it increases in magnitude, 
corresponding now to a rise of average growth rates by 0.32pp for a doubling of EU 
funds.15 A similarly large, positive and statistically significant effect is obtained also 
in column (3), where we examine the effect of assignment into Objective 1 status. 
Our results show that regions obtaining Objective 1 funds grew on average by 0.8 
percentage points faster than other regions, annually, during the 1994-2013 period. 
The inclusion of the Objective 1 dummy changes little the obtained beta-
convergence coefficient (from 0.307 to 0.297) and thus the estimated effect of 
assignment cannot be seen as capturing an inverse income-selection effect, whereby 
poorer regions become assigned to Objective 1 status and at the same time grow 
faster due to neoclassical convergence.  
In column (4) we test for a non-linear effect of EU funds on economic growth. 
Previous studies have evidenced the presence of decreasing returns to Cohesion 
Policy expenditures in European regions (Becker et al., 2012; Cerqua & Pellegrini, 
2017). In our estimation (column (4)), the quadratic term of EU funds is negative – 
consistent with the hypothesis of decreasing returns – but not statistically 
significant. This indicates that in the UK case, the level of EU expenditures has not 
been sufficiently high for decreasing returns to kick-in. Indeed, no region in our 
sample surpasses the ‘maximum desirable intensity’ threshold estimated by Cerqua 
and Pellegrini (2017) using EU28 data. In line with this, the positive and significant 
coefficient of the interaction term between the Objective 1 dummy and EU funds in 
                                                 
 15 This positive relationship is also confirmed when EU funds are normalised by GDP (see Table A4 in Appendix).  
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column (5) shows that, even among the highly-funded Objective 1 regions, those 
receiving more funds are those displaying the fastest growth rates.  
Our next step is to examine whether the results obtained from the annual data 
replicate themselves across programming periods. To do so, we aggregate our 
annual data to the level of the three programming periods and re-estimate the 
models of columns (2) and (3) (see columns (6) and (7)). As can be seen, the results 
remain particularly stable, providing additional confidence on the growth effects 
estimated from the annual data and suggesting that these effects are not driven 
merely by year-on-year variations, which are more likely to suffer from endogeneity 
problems. As a further test of robustness, in the last column of Table 1 we examine 
whether the positive estimate found for assignment to Objective 1 status may be 
driven instead by a negative effect of ‘de-assignment’ (losing Objective 1 
eligibility16). We do this by introducing separate dummies for regions entering and 
exiting Objective 1 status. Our results show clearly that the relationship obtained 
earlier is not driven by ‘de-assignment’ but exclusively by entry into Objective 1 
status. This intuitive result increases further our confidence in the validity of our 
results and of our interpretation of them as showing evidence of a robust 
relationship between Cohesion Policy interventions and regional growth 
performance. 
 
6. The impact of concentration and targeting  
The results of the previous section present evidence for the positive role played by 
Cohesion Policy in the UK. In this section we take our analysis further, to examine 
the role played by aspects of design, as discussed previously. We first look at the 
effect of concentrating Cohesion Policy interventions on specific investment pillars; 
                                                 
 16 Di Cataldo (2017) has found some evidence of such a negative effect in the case of South Yorkshire.  
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and then move on to study the role of the alignment of investments with observed 
socio-economic needs of regions or alternatively with regional areas of 
specialisation.17 
 
6.1 Concentration 
Our examination of the issue of concentration is threefold. First, testing whether the 
positive effect found for Cohesion Policy interventions at large is specific to any 
particular expenditure category. Second, testing whether a disproportionate 
allocation of funds into any one category has tractable beneficial effects on regional 
growth. And, third, testing whether the overall concentration of funding produces 
in itself positive effects on regional growth. We present the results from these tests 
in Table 2.  
For completeness, we start in column (1) by examining whether the positive effect 
of EU funds found earlier (column (6) in Table 1) is also present in our commitments 
data. As can be seen, the coefficient on total per capita commitments is positive and 
statistically significant (albeit smaller than in the case of actual payments over the 
three programming periods). This positive effect does not appear to be driven by 
any one particular spending category. In column (2), where we introduce the per 
capita commitments separately for each pillar, no single category emerges as the 
most growth-conducive, as none of them passes the standard thresholds of 
statistical significance. Interestingly, on the whole, the pillar variables are jointly 
statistically significant, as reported in the F-test at the bottom of Table 2. Even 
                                                 
 17 Following a recommendation by a referee, we have tested all of our models for problems of spatial autocorrelation (Lagrange Multiplier test statistics for error and lag dependence are reported in Tables 2 and 3; a full set of results obtained from spatial lag fixed effects panel estimations using the -spregxt- module in Stata is reported in Tables A5 and A6 in the Appendix; a fuller set of results, including tests for cross-lag dependence capturing spatial spillovers from the EU variables are available upon request). The tests raise little concern about estimation problems emanating from spatial autocorrelation and the estimated effects for our policy variables remain qualitatively (and in some cases even numerically) the same.  
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though in statistical terms this indicates the presence of multicollinearity, in 
analytical terms it suggests that concentration of funds in specific categories does 
not contribute positively to regional growth, even if jointly funding is beneficial. 
Table 2 Sectoral concentration of EU funds by programming period and economic growth in UK NUTS2 regions, 2000-2013 
Dep. Variable: Δ ln GDP per capita  Funds per capita Shares of total  (1) (2) (3) (4) Initial ln GDP per capita -0.124*** -0.102*** -0.130*** -0.130***  (0.0350) (0.0258) (0.0271) (0.0238) EU funds per capita 2.36e-05*     (1.35e-05)    
EU funds for:     Human resources  -9.94e-05 -0.0136    (0.000507) (0.0293)  Transport infrastructure  0.000738 0.100*    (0.000860) (0.0580)  RTD & Innovation  -9.06e-05 0.0277    (5.83e-05) (0.0401)  Tourism, culture and regeneration  0.000140 -0.0279    (0.000258) (0.0275)  Business development  0.000487 0.0292*    (0.000292) (0.0151)  Concentration of funds     -0.0224**     (0.0104) Programming period 2007-2013 -0.0163** -0.0117* -0.0158 -0.0193***  (0.00693) (0.00620) (0.0103) (0.00678) Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ LM lag 0.1231 0.0025 0.1565 0.1022  (0.726) (0.960) (0.692) (0.749) LM error 0.6194 0.0087 0.3866 0.5528  (0.431) (0.926) (0.534) (0.457) VIF statistic (overall) 1.83 3.65 3.64 2.18 Observations 74 74 74 74 R-squared 0.974 0.983 0.981 0.979 NUTS2 regions 37 37 37 37 Joint significance of EU funds variables: F test (p-value)  4.579 (0.00247) 2.570 (0.0435)  Clustered standard errors at NUTS2 level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EU funds per capita: commitments per  programming period.  
Similar evidence is obtained when we look instead at the sectoral shares over total 
commitments per region, as shown in column (3). The shares for Business 
development and Transport infrastructure return coefficients that are positive and 
(only marginally) statistically significant (and jointly all shares are again statistically 
Marco Di Cataldo & Vassilis Monastiriotis 
 21 
significant), but overall the results do not provide strong evidence of a positive 
effect of concentration of committed expenditures on growth. Indeed, our evidence 
suggests that, if anything, concentration may be harmful to regional growth: in 
column (4) the Herfindahl measure of concentration returns a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient.  
All our results seem to indicate that, in the UK case, thematic concentration of EU 
funds has no beneficial effect on growth. Instead, it appears that it is the 
combination of commitments across investment axes that creates positive synergies. 
 
6.2 Targeting 
We now turn to the examination of the growth effects of the three variables related 
to targeting. The core results from our analysis of this are reported in Table 3.18 As 
can be seen, we find strong evidence that lack of congruence between relative 
regional needs and the within-regions allocation of the available funds (horizontal 
misalignment) is negatively associated with regional growth. The obtained 
coefficient in column (1) is statistically significant and quite sizeable in magnitude, 
suggesting that a two-unit rise in horizontal misalignment (equal to 10% of the 
theoretical maximum) is associated with a decline in regional growth by 0.19 
percentage points. This represents without doubt a rather significant economic cost. 
In contrast, our evidence suggests that vertical misalignment and our alternative 
measure of spending on one’s area of specialisation have no impact on regional 
growth. Vertical misalignment returns a highly insignificant effect, both when using 
our preferred sector-based definition (column (2)) and when using the alternative 
                                                 
 18 We have run a large number of robustness checks using alternative model specifications (e.g., no controls or controlling for the actual level of commitments instead of assignment) and definitions of effort (e.g., measured in absolute money terms) and need (e.g., using alternative socio-economic variables – for example, replacing our unit labour costs measure with a measure of average firm size for our measure of business need). Our results, available upon request, are very robust to such changes.  
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definition of need based on the ranking of regions in terms of their GDP per capita 
(column (3)). Likewise, the variable measuring expenditures in a region’s area of 
specialisation (column (4)) also returns a not statistically significant effect, 
indicating that, on the whole, targeting investments on a region’s area of advantage 
does not enhance regional growth.  
All of these results remain unchanged when we estimate a full model which 
includes all three variables linked to targeting of investments (column (5)). Vertical 
misalignment and targeting on specialisations remain fully insignificant 
statistically, while horizontal misalignment continues to have a negative and 
statistically significant effect on growth.  
The conclusion about the effect of spending on one’s area of specialisation is also 
supported by our further exploration of the issue, examining the interaction effect 
between spending and advantage as discussed earlier (results reported in Table A7 
in the Appendix). In this case, two pillars – RTDI and Tourism – return a positive 
effect when interacted with a region’s performance in the same area. In both cases, 
however, the direct effect of spending is negative, with the implication that the 
estimated interaction effect shows a relative, rather than an absolute, influence on 
regional growth (i.e., that spending on, say, tourism is more beneficial for touristic 
areas vis-à-vis others but not necessarily beneficial in absolute terms). Spending on 
areas of advantage does not seem to produce any growth effects, absolute or 
relative, for investments in Transport infrastructure and Business development; 
while the effect is even negative for the case of Human resources (indicating that 
spending more on education in a region that already possesses an educational 
advantage is not growth-enhancing). These results are consistent with the evidence 
presented in Tables 2 and 3. Spending in individual investment categories seems to 
produce limited and on the whole non-traceable growth effects; while investing on 
one’s area of advantage does not have a universally beneficial effect – even though 
it confers a relative advantage to regions specialising in R&D and tourism.  
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Invariably in all models examined, the only effect that comes out consistently as the 
main influence on growth (besides assignment/intensity addressed in section 5) is 
that of horizontal misalignment. We see this as strong evidence showing, not only 
that fund-deployment strategies at large matter for regional growth, but especially 
that targeting investments on a region’s relative needs is an important ingredient 
for an effective regional development strategy – independently from the actual 
effort (scale of investments) allocated to that region. 
Table 3 Misalignment between regional targets and regional needs and economic growth in UK NUTS2 regions, 2000-2013 
Dep. Variable: Δ ln GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)       Initial ln GDP per capita -0.128*** -0.123*** -0.123*** -0.123*** -0.127***  (0.0285) (0.0312) (0.0308) (0.0310) (0.0291) Horizontal misalignment  -0.000945**    -0.000915**  (0.000437)    (0.000451) Vertical misalignment (needs-based)  0.000106   0.000152  (0.000347)   (0.000341) Vertical misalignment (GDPpc-based)   1.78e-05     (0.000252)   Spending in area of specialisation    -0.00194 -0.000016     (0.00688) (0.000028) Objective 1 regions 0.0131** 0.0128** 0.0128** 0.0138** 0.0147**  (0.00610) (0.00507) (0.00516) (0.00522) (0.00626) Programming period 2007-2013 -0.0136* -0.0133* -0.0131* -0.0132* -0.0145**  (0.00675) (0.00717) (0.00702) (0.00694) (0.00695) Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ LM lag 0.3775 0.3202 0.3212 0.2510 0.2622  (0.539) (0.572) (0.571) (0.616) (0.609) LM error 1.0925 0.7320 1.1500 0.6222 0.5439  (0.296) (0.392) (0.284) (0.430) (0.461) VIF statistic (overall) 1.88 2.12 1.93 2.03 2.18 Observations 74 74 74 74 74 R-squared 0.979 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.979 NUTS2 regions 37 37 37 37 37 Clustered standard errors at NUTS2 level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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7. Conclusions and policy implications 
The recent decision of Britain to exit the European Union has brought increased 
attention to the question of the effects of Cohesion Policy interventions in the 
country and to the future of regional policy after Brexit. Despite a sizeable literature 
examining the growth effects of Cohesion Policy, evidence of its effects in the 
particular case of the UK is scarce. Also limited is the evidence on the role that the 
prioritising of interventions into specific investment categories plays for the overall 
effectiveness of the policy and for regional growth at large.  
In this paper we sought to address these questions using previously unused data 
for the UK covering three programming periods with detail on funding allocations 
(commitments) across different investment categories. Inspired by some – rather 
selective – evidence on the issue of targeting offered recently by Crescenzi et al. 
(2017), we developed a novel methodology which allowed us to measure the 
alignment between regional needs and the prioritising of commitments across 
investment pillars; and to examine, on the basis of this, how the level, concentration 
and targeting of investments impacts on regional growth.  
Our results provide a unique picture with regard to the role of EU funds for regional 
growth in the UK. We have shown that the level of funds allocated to regions has a 
positive and non-exhaustible effect on growth, suggesting that Cohesion Policy 
interventions are productive irrespective of their scale. Further, we have shown that 
assignment into Objective 1 status also has a positive growth effect, which is 
additional to that of actual expenditures (Table 1, column (5)) and non-symmetric 
(Table 1, column (8)). Concentration of spending, however, in any one investment 
pillar does not appear to bear an advantage. Although spending in transport and 
business development seems to be marginally more beneficial, by and large it is the 
total commitments that account for the positive effect of Cohesion Policy on growth. 
Indeed, over-concentration of commitments across categories seems, if anything, to 
be negatively associated with regional growth. This applies also to the case of 
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concentration on specific areas of advantage. Our investigation of this showed that 
expenditures targeting areas of regional advantage do not produce positive growth 
effects on the whole: such targeting was found to have a positive effect only vis-à-
vis other regions and only for regions specialising in innovation or tourism.  
The key finding in our analysis concerns the impact of misalignment between the 
targeting of investment efforts and relative regional needs. On the one hand, the 
finding that vertical misalignment does not exert an influence on regional growth 
suggests that allocation of funds to regions is beneficial irrespective of whether 
these are the most needy in terms of socio-economic indicators and, indeed, in terms 
of initial level of GDP per capita. This is on the whole a favourable outcome for 
Cohesion Policy: it suggests that Cohesion Policy interventions are highly 
productive irrespective of place and local conditions and, thus, that principles of 
allocation favouring poorer regions have no efficiency costs. On the other hand, the 
finding that horizontal misalignment between regional needs and investment 
allocations has a strong negative effect on regional growth speaks directly to the 
importance of giving due consideration to the local socio-economic context – and 
needs – in the design and prioritising of Cohesion Policy interventions. It is 
interesting to note that this is broadly the direction followed by Cohesion Policy in 
recent years – with more emphasis to ‘place-based’, tailored interventions, that are 
more sensitive to local specificities and consider more carefully local socio-
economic assets and needs. Our results seem to vindicate and reinforce this 
approach.19   
Our results also have strong implications in relation to Brexit. Cohesion Policy has 
been over a long period a significant stimulant to regional (and national) growth 
and, due to its focus on economically backward regions, a significant force for 
                                                 
 19 It must be noted, however, that our findings are specific to the UK case. The extent to which these results generalise to other countries and across the EU at large is an open question, which we hope to address in future research.  
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regional convergence in the country. The prospective withdrawal of the UK from 
the EU and the loss of eligibility for Cohesion Policy funding will thus not only 
deprive the UK’s regional economies from an important source of investment funds 
but most definitely also from a mechanism via which forces of economic divergence 
have been in the past – at least partly – neutralised. It follows that policy efforts in 
the post-EU era should concentrate on developing a similarly-funded regional 
development policy which will substitute for the withdrawal of the Cohesion Policy 
interventions and, indeed, improve on these. On the basis of our results, positive 
features to maintain include the EU’s approach to multi-annual programming and 
area designation (e.g., Objective 1 – as our results show an additional growth 
advantage from this). Inversely, features to improve upon would include perhaps 
an upping in the level of spending (as, at the level of EU expenditures in the country, 
we do not find any evidence of diminishing returns to investments), a move away 
from concentration of funds in specific investment categories unless the regional 
structure is already predisposed for a good use of such investments and, above all, 
an increased attention to targeting of investments so that they match the specific 
pre-existing weaknesses of each region. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 EU investment pillars and source of aggregation from 2000-2006 and 2007-2013 periods 
Investment pillar Fields of Intervention (FOIs),  2000-2006 
Fields of Intervention (FOIs),  
2007-2013 
Transport infrastructure Priority theme 31: Transport infrastructure (sub-categories 311-319) Priority theme: Transport Infrastructure (sub-categories 16 to 32) 
Research Technological Development & 
Innovation (RTDI) 
Priority theme 18: Research, technological development and innovation (RTDI) (sub-categories 181-184) 
Priority theme: Research and technological development (R&TD), innovation and entrepreneurship (sub-categories 01-07 and 09) 
Human resources Priority theme 2: Human resources (sub-categories 21-25) 
Priority theme: Increasing the adaptability of workers and firms, enterprises and entrepreneurs (sub-categories 62-64); Priority theme: Improving access to employment and sustainability (sub-categories 65-70); Priority theme: Improving the social inclusion of less-favoured persons (sub-category 71); Priority theme: Improving human capital (sub-categories 72-74); Priority theme: Mobilisation for reforms in the fields of employment and inclusion (sub-category 80) 
Tourism, culture and regeneration 
Priority theme 17: Tourism (sub-categories 171-174); Priority theme 35: Planning and rehabilitation (sub-categories 351-354) 
Priority theme: Tourism (sub-categories 55-57); Priority theme: Culture (sub-categories 58-60); Priority theme: Urban and rural regeneration (sub-category 61) 
Business development 
Priority theme 15: Assisting large business organisations (sub-categories 151-155) Priority theme 16: Assisting SMEs and the craft sector (sub-categories 161-167) Priority theme: other investment in firms (sub-category 8) Source: DG Regional Policy.   
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Table A2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Annual data 
Δ ln GDP per capita 656 0.027 0.043 ln GDP per capita 693 10.03 0.310 EU funds per capita 740 27.70 37.32 EU funds as share of GDP 693 0.0013 0.0019 Objective 1 regions 740 0.081 0.273 Percentage of unemployment benefit claimants 726 2.185 1.105 Patent applications per thousand inhabitants 703 0.078 0.052 Percentage of employed people with tertiary education 735 29.35 8.452 Percentage of people employed in agriculture 693 2.534 2.669 
Programming period data Annualised GDP pc growth rate 109 0.032 0.029 Annualised ln GDP pc at beginning of programming period 109 9.951 0.342 EU funds (payments) per capita (annualised) 111 28.21 31.91 EU funds (payments) as share of GDP (annualised) 109 0.0014 0.0019 
EU funds (commitments) per capita for:    Transport infrastructure 74 11.91 32.39 RTD & Innovation 74 30.17 45.47 Human resources 74 105.92 80.26 Tourism, culture and regeneration 74 20.54 38.04 Business development 74 60.23 66.63 Total 74 263.86 276.76 
Share of EU funds (commitments) for:    Transport infrastructure 74 0.02 0.05 RTD & Innovation 74 0.13 0.12 Human resources 74 0.55 0.19 Tourism, culture and regeneration 74 0.07 0.06 Business development 74 0.24 0.13 Concentration (Herfindahl) index  74 0.45 0.20 
Variables used for calculating 'regional needs':    Km of roads per inhabitant  74 8.17 4.11 Km of roads per square km  74 3.06 2.65 Touristic establishments per 1000 inhabitants 74 1.85 2.42 Tourist arrivals per inhabitant 74 1.69 1.44 Patent applications per thousand inhabitants  74 0.08 0.05 Percentage of people employed in high-tech  74 5.05 1.79 Percentage of employed people with tertiary education  74 27.46 5.74 Percentage of unemployment benefit claimants  74 1.84 0.80 Per employee investment in manufacturing 74 319.87 224.39 Ratio of GVA to wages & salaries in manufacturing 74 2.20 1.68 
Dissimilarity indices:    Vertical misalignment (needs-based) 74 8.48 6.18 Vertical misalignment (GDPpc-based) 74 6.50 5.67 Horizontal misalignment 74 9.00 2.43 
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Table A3 Variables used to calculate performance indicators in the five pillars Variable Approximating regional conditions in: Km of roads per inhabitant  Transport infrastructure Km of roads per square km    Touristic establishments per 1000 inhabitants Tourism, culture and regeneration Tourist arrivals per inhabitant   Patent applications per thousand inhabitants  Research, Technological Development and Innovation Percentage of people employed in high-tech    Percentage of employed people with tertiary education  Human resources Percentage of unemployment benefit claimants (inversed)   Investment in manufacturing per employee Business development Ratio of GVA to wages & salaries in manufacturing 
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Table A4 EU funds as share of GDP and economic growth in UK NUTS2 regions, 1994-2013   Annual data Programming periods 
Dep. Variable: Δ ln GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)             Initial ln GDP per capita -0.217*** -0.304*** -0.305*** -0.301*** -0.188***  (0.0382) (0.0340) (0.0343) (0.0356) (0.0241) EU funds as share of GDP 1.172** 1.729** 2.383 1.782 1.226*  (0.449) (0.839) (1.590) (1.589) (0.615) EU funds as share of GDP squared   -66.32       (140.6)    Objective 1 regions    0.00755       (0.00607)   (Obj1 regions) x (EU funds as share of GDP)    1.295**       (0.561)          Controls  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Year/programming period dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Observations 693 613 613 613 109 R-squared 0.750 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.952 NUTS2 regions 37 37 37 37 37 Clustered standard errors at NUTS2 level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EU funds as share of GDP: payments per year (columns (1)-(4); payments per programming period (column (5)). 
EU Cohesion Policy in the UK 
 
    32 
Table A5 Spatial Panel Lag with Fixed-Effects (SAR-XT) for models of Table 2 
Dep. Variable: Δ ln GDP per capita  Funds per capita Shares of total  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spatial lag of GDP pc growth 0.245 0.137 -0.178 -0.247 
 (0.286) (0.275) (0.301) (0.309) 
Initial ln GDP per capita -0.113*** -0.0944** -0.136*** -0.138*** 
 (0.0356) (0.0368) (0.0355) (0.0332) 
EU funds per capita 2.30e-05**    
 (1.08e-05)    
EU funds for:  -8.75e-06 -0.0143  
Human resources  (6.74e-05) (0.0244)  
  0.000100 0.105*  
Transport infrastructure  (9.74e-05) (0.0589)  
  -9.80e-05 0.0290  
RTD & Innovation  (7.67e-05) (0.0410)  
  2.22e-05 -0.0264  
Tourism, culture and regeneration  (4.42e-05) (0.0410)  
  6.50e-05 0.0314  
Business development  (4.46e-05) (0.0188)  
    -0.0263** 
Concentration of funds     (0.0104) 
 -0.00638 -0.00666 -0.0232 -0.0303* 
Programming period 2007-2013 (0.0149) (0.0145) (0.0184) (0.0172) 
 0.245 0.137 -0.178 -0.247 
Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
LM SAC 2.0932 2.6307 0.0714 2.9804 
 (0.351) (0.268) (0.965) (0.225) 
Observations 74 74 74 74 
R-squared (R2h) 0.426 0.511 0.335 0.346 
NUTS2 regions 37 37 37 37 Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EU funds per capita: commitments per programming period.   
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Table A6 Spatial Panel Lag with Fixed-Effects (SAR-XT) for models of Table 3 
Dep. Variable: Δ ln GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)       Spatial lag of GDP pc growth 0.151 0.137 0.169 0.187 0.152  (0.274) (0.292) (0.313) (0.311) (0.303) Initial ln GDP per capita -0.120*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.113*** -0.120***  (0.0344) (0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0371) (0.0362) Horizontal misalignment  -0.000949*    -0.000946*  (0.000471)    (0.000499) Vertical misalignment (needs-based)  9.76e-05   0.000110  (0.000334)   (0.000329) Vertical misalignment (GDPpc-based)   7.90e-05     (0.000318)   Spending in area of specialisation    -0.00394 -0.000527     (0.00950) (0.00960) Objective 1 regions 0.0137** 0.0133** 0.0132** 0.0154* 0.0139*  (0.00587) (0.00626) (0.00631) (0.00795) (0.00781) Programming period 2007-2013 -0.00820 -0.00843 -0.00721 -0.00657 -0.00843  (0.0136) (0.0145) (0.0149) (0.0149) (0.0145) Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ LM SAC 0.0046 0.3351 0.0985 0.1436 0.3278  (0.998) (0.846) (0.952) (0.931) (0.849) Observations 74 74 74 74 74 R-squared (R2h) 0.414 0.420 0.428 0.432 0.413 NUTS2 regions 37 37 37 37 37 Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A7  Sectoral specialisation and EU funds per capita by pillar in UK regions, 2000-2013  
  
Dep. Variable: Δ ln GDP per capita EU funds pc for / initial performance in:  Human resources Transport infrastructure RTD & Innovation Tourism, culture and regeneration Business development (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)             Initial ln GDP per capita -0.0931*** -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.158*** -0.112***  (0.0250) (0.0253) (0.0245) (0.0188) (0.0253) EU funds per capita 0.000216*** -8.71e-05 -6.66e-05* -0.000167*** 6.29e-05*  (7.26e-05) (0.000165) (3.90e-05) (2.82e-05) (3.21e-05) Performance indicator 0.00809 0.0764 0.0331*** 0.0101 0.00612  (0.0203) (0.0658) (0.0109) (0.0238) (0.00414) (EU funds pc) x (Performance indicator) -0.000257*** 3.16e-05 0.000492*** 0.000329** 4.29e-05 (7.46e-05) (0.000206) (0.000179) (0.000129) (0.000122) Vertical misalignment -3.34e-05 -0.000134 -0.000454 -0.000181 0.000160  (0.000279) (0.000337) (0.000301) (0.000321) (0.000338) Horizontal misalignment -0.000586 -0.000770* -0.000862** -0.00101** -0.000568*  (0.000494) (0.000399) (0.000383) (0.000402) (0.000340) Objective 1 regions 0.000540 0.0196** 0.00969** 0.0282*** 0.0112*  (0.00880) (0.00844) (0.00452) (0.00380) (0.00564)       Programming period 2007-2013 -0.0272*** -0.0116 -0.0164** -0.00426 -0.0147**  (0.00600) (0.00750) (0.00716) (0.00521) (0.00671) Controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Observations 74 74 74 74 74 R-squared 0.984 0.982 0.985 0.986 0.984 NUTS2 regions 37 37 37 37 37 Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. EU funds per capita: commitments per programming period. As noted in the text, the measures of performance are composite indexes of base socio-economic variables. For each model, variables entering in the composite index of performance (e.g. the shares of unemployed and tertiary educated for the 
case of the ‘human resources’ model), are excluded from the list of controls in the same specifications.   
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Table A8 Main results displaying coefficients of control variables 
  Annual data Programming period data 
Dep. Variable: Δ ln GDP per capita (1) (2) (3) (4) Initial ln GDP per capita -0.307*** -0.297*** -0.130*** -0.127***  (0.0350) (0.0340) (0.0238) (0.0291) EU funds per capita 0.000114**     (4.49e-05)    Objective 1 regions  0.00857* 0.00906* 0.0147**   (0.00437) (0.00474) (0.00626) Concentration of funds (Herfindahl index)   -0.0181*     (0.0103)  Horizontal misalignment     -0.000915**     (0.000451) Vertical misalignment    0.000152     (0.000341) Spending in area of specialisation    -0.000016     (0.000028) Patent applications per 1000 inhabitants 0.100 0.105 0.233*** 0.172***  (0.0962) (0.0945) (0.0702) (0.0616) Employed people with tertiary education 0.000335 0.000358 0.000187 8.71e-05  (0.000227) (0.000229) (0.000152) (0.000146) Agricultural employment -0.000409 -7.65e-05 -0.00357 -0.00442  (0.00162) (0.00173) (0.00303) (0.00326) Unemployment benefit claimants -0.0237*** -0.0243*** -0.00912 -0.00836*  (0.00466) (0.00476) (0.00579) (0.00453) Programming period 2007-2013   -0.0193*** -0.0138*    (0.00678) (0.00703) Region dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Year/programming period dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Observations 613 613 74 74 R-squared 0.778 0.776 0.980 0.981 NUTS2 regions 37 37 37 37 Clustered standard errors at NUTS2 level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Year dummies included in columns (1) -(2), programming period dummies included in columns (3)-(4). EU funds per capita: payments per programming period.   
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Figure A1 Misalignments targeting-needs 
 
 
 
 Note: Categories of misalignment (high, medium, low) defined on the basis of quantiles.    
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